UPDATE: In a double whammy, SCOTUS also ruled that the former president has substantial protection from prosecution, kicking the case back to the lower courts.

The Supreme Court held on Friday that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had interpreted an obstruction statute too broadly when charging hundreds of defendants for their involvement in the January 6 Capitol riot. In a 6-3 decision in the case of Fischer v. United States, the Court sided with a defendant who challenged the use of Section 1512(c)(2), which prescribes up to 20 years in prison for anyone who “obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding.”

Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, clarified that to prove a violation of Section 1512(c)(2), the government must demonstrate that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding. The ruling vacated the judgment of the D.C. Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation.

The DOJ had charged over 350 of the 1,424 defendants following January 6 with “corruptly obstructing, influencing, or impeding an official proceeding.” Many of these defendants had already been granted early release in light of the Supreme Court’s decision to hear the case.

Joseph Fischer, charged under Section 1512(c)(2), argued that the DOJ’s application of the statute to prosecute those obstructing Congress’s certification of the 2020 election was an unprecedented expansion. He noted that the statute was enacted as part of the Corporate Fraud and Accountability Act of 2002, aimed at deterring fraud and abuse by corporate executives through evidence tampering.

With the Supreme Court’s ruling, lower courts will now reassess the sufficiency of the charges brought against Fischer and potentially hundreds of other defendants indicted under the same statute. Roberts emphasized that the government’s broad interpretation of Section 1512 could infringe upon the constitutional arrangement of federal crimes, granting prosecutors undue discretion to seek severe sentences.

This decision also affects special counsel Jack Smith’s election interference case against former President Donald Trump, where two of the charges involve the same statute. The Court will soon rule on Trump’s bid to dismiss this case based on presidential immunity.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, concurring with the majority, noted the Court’s task was to define the scope of conduct proscribed by the statute, agreeing that Section 1512(c)(2) is limited by the preceding list of criminal violations in Section 1512(c)(1).

In dissent, Justice Amy Coney Barrett, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor, argued that the majority failed to respect the prerogatives of the political branches, emphasizing that it is Congress’s role to determine the breadth of a statute. Barrett contended that Section 1512(c)(2) is an expansive statute and that the Court should not narrow its scope without legislative direction.

This ruling underscores the Supreme Court’s role in interpreting the limits of criminal statutes and sets a precedent for how obstruction charges should be applied in future cases.